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While many of Elizabeth Anscombe’s philosophical views are well-known (e.g. her 
views on practical knowledge or consequentialism), little has been written on her 
philosophical method, i.e., on her way of doing philosophy. This is unfortunate, for two 
reasons : First, the failure to understand Anscombe’s method is a major stumbling block 
for many of her readers. Second, and more importantly, we can still learn a lot from 
Anscombe’s way of doing philosophy : Her view differs considerably from current 
alternatives in metaphilosophy. Here we want to begin to fill this lacuna. 
The paper is organized as follows : In Section 1, we describe an argumentative 
pattern that can be found in many of Anscombe’s essays. This pattern is not the only one 
in her methodological toolkit, but it is particularly important. In Section 2, we isolate this 
pattern in three of Anscombe’s essays. In Section 3, we locate Anscombe’s implicit 
« philosophy of philosophy » relative to some rival metaphilosophies. 
 
1. A Recurring Pattern in Anscombe’s Work 
The method on which we shall focus can be described as a four-step pattern. 
Anscombe applies this template to a large variety of topics, and her arguments at each 
step vary accordingly, but the general pattern can be described in the abstract. 
 
1.1. Step 1 : Philosophically Puzzling « What Is x ? » - Questions 
Anscombe uses this four-step pattern in cases where questions of the form « What 
is x ? » or « What does “x” mean ? » seem philosophically important. These questions are 
her starting point. Often, the first step involves a move from « What is x ? » to « What does 
‘x’ mean ? » Note that in asking the latter, Anscombe is not interested in questions 
regarding a particular language or a particular conception of x. She is interested in how 
we can understand and talk about x at all, i.e., what it is to understand and talk about x. 
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Here « about » is used in a thin sense that is roughly one of the senses that Ryle1 famously 
groups together under the heading of « about-linguistic » 2 . After all, we cannot 
presuppose that x exists and that we are not confused about what our words refer to etc. 
Anscombe usually starts by asking « What is x ? » The x in question typically plays 
(or seems to play) an important role in our practical or theoretical lives, and we take 
ourselves to have some grip on what x is. On reflection, however, puzzling questions 
regarding x arise, and we end up with a peculiar kind of puzzlement that we might call 
« philosophical puzzlement ». We somehow feel that we should know the answers to the 
puzzling questions regarding x and that empirical investigations will not help us answer 
them. But when pressed to answer them, we either don’t know what to say or we are 
inclined to give answers that Anscombe reveals to be trivial, incoherent or highly 
implausible. 
 
1.2. Step 2 : A Translation or Analysis of ‘x’ Is Impossible 
Anscombe’s next step with respect to these puzzling cases is to argue that there can 
be no straightforward answer (as we shall call it) to the question what x is or what « x » 
means. Anscombe sometimes calls the type of answer she has in mind here a « translation 
or analysis3  » ; sometimes she calls it a « definition4  ». The idea is that the questions 
« What is x ? » and « What does “x” mean ? » can be answered by providing an expression 
« y » such that the answer « to be an x is to be a y » or « “x” means the same as “y” » 
respectively is informative and satisfying. Examples of such (alleged) straightforward 
answers may be the following : « Knowledge that P is a justified, true belief that P » or 
« The word “I” means the same as “the speaker/thinker of this” ». Such a « translation or 
analysis » must be non-circular ; we must be able to understand « y » without any prior 
understanding of x. Furthermore, the equivalence of « x » and « y » must help us to resolve 
our puzzlement regarding x. The connection between x and y might be a conceptual 
connection, or it might be some kind of metaphysical entailment or some kind of reductive 
explanation. 
In many philosophically puzzling cases, Anscombe thinks, no such « translation or 
                                                        
1 G. Ryle, « About », Analysis 1/1, 1933, p. 10-12. 
2 Thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting this clarification (and further helpful comments). 
3 G. E. M. Anscombe, « The Reality of the Past », in The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe 
(vol. II), Oxford, Blackwell, 1981, p. 116. 
4 G. E. M. Anscombe, « On the Source of the Authority of the State », in  The Collected Philosophical Papers of 
G. E. M. Anscombe (vol. III), Oxford, Blackwell, 1981, p. 138. 
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analysis » is to be had. For some of these, she argues that any straightforward answer 
must run in a circle, for others, that all possible candidates for a « translation or analysis » 
must be rejected. In any event, our philosophical puzzle regarding x cannot be solved by 
giving a « translation or analysis » of « x ». 
In this situation, we must find a different way of answering the questions « What is 
x ? » or « What does “x” mean ? » We need an explanation of x or the meaning of « x » that 
is not a translation, analysis or definition in Anscombe’s sense. She says : « definition is 
not the only mode of explanation5 ». This is not the platitude that some explanations are 
not definitions. She claims that there are illuminating answers to the questions « What is 
x ? » or « What does “x” mean ? » that do not provide informative and non-circular 
necessary and sufficient conditions for something being an x or meaning the same as « x » 
– and that in the philosophically puzzling cases at hand the right answers are of this kind. 
 
1.3. Step 3 : Descriptions of Our Practices or Abilities Provide an Answer 
Anscombe’s own solutions for philosophically puzzling cases rest on accounts of 
how we think about, talk about and act with respect to x. Such an account usually takes 
the form of a description of a practice or an ability6. This has two advantages. First, it 
allows Anscombe to use « x » in her description of our abilities and practices, where no 
« translation » is possible. After all, she is giving an account that situates our thinking and 
talking about x in the world, and the relevant worldly facts may involve x. In « The Reality 
of the Past », for instance, it allows her to use the past tense in an explanation of how our 
talk about the past connects with the actual past7. 
A second advantage of Anscombe’s descriptive approach is that it puts sufficient 
distance between us and our common thought, talk and action regarding x, so as to see it 
as something that plays a non-mysterious role in the overall fabric of our practices and 
abilities. 
 
1.4. Step 4 : How This is a Solution 
Anscombe’s final step is to demonstrate how the resulting account can resolve the 
                                                        
5 Ibid. 
6 Anscombe often sees such practices as grounded in or justified by something that – in contrast to the 
practice itself – does not depend on human conventions, e.g., a universal human need. This is particularly 
important in the normative domain. 
7 G. E. M. Anscombe, « The reality of the Past », art. cit., p. 118. 
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philosophical puzzle with which we began – even though we still don’t have a « translation 
or analysis » of « x ». As we will see below, Anscombe at this point often presents results 
that have a therapeutic or deflationary aspect. Thus, her resolution often seems less 
« substantive » than one might have expected. Nevertheless, Anscombe’s results are often 
not exclusively concerned with thought or language, and they often constitute surprising 
theses about x. 
 
2. Three Examples 
The above is an abstract description of Anscombe’s four-step pattern. In the current 
section, we shall show how this pattern occurs at crucial passages in her writing, using as 
our examples arguments from three important essays : « Rules, Rights and Promises », 
« The First Person » and « The Intentionality of Sensation ». The same pattern can also be 
found in other places (e.g. in « The Reality of the Past »). But the three cases we are going 
to discuss strike us as important, representative and diverse enough to be helpful 
examples. 
We cannot do justice to any of these rich and difficult papers, and we don’t want to 
discuss – let alone defend – the substantive philosophical theses put forward in them. Our 
point is that they share a common argumentative structure. 
 
2.1. « Rules, Rights and Promises » 
In « Rules, Rights and Promises », Anscombe asks : What is a rule, a right or a 
promise ? Hume already posed this question for promises, and he answered that promises 
are not « naturally intelligible8 » ; i.e., we cannot understand what promises are without 
understanding human practices and social conventions. Anscombe thinks that the same 
holds for rules and rights as well. Let us go through the four steps of her pattern, as it 
occurs in that paper. 
Step 1 : Rules, rights and promises can be defined as entities that make certain 
actions necessary for us. Sometimes we must do something because a rule says so, because 
somebody else has a right that we do it or because we have given a promise. What is this 
necessity that rules, rights and promises generate ? What does it mean to say that doing 
something is « necessary » in this sense ? 
                                                        
8 D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford University Press, T 3.2.5, §1. 
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Step 2 : A straightforward answer to these questions would take the form : « the 
relevant kind of necessity is … » or « the expression “necessary” as used in the context of 
rules, rights, and promises means … » respectively – where what goes into the place of the 
dots can be understood without already understanding the necessity. We say in what 
sense it is necessary to perform the action by saying in what sense it is impossible not to 
perform it, where this explanation of the impossibility is independently intelligible. 
Anscombe argues that no such independently intelligible explanation can be found ; all 
answers that take the above form are ultimately circular. The only plausible answer is that 
one cannot perform the necessary act without being guilty of something : doing a wrong, 
making a mistake, being unjust, etc. As it turns out, though, we cannot understand the 
relevant kind of guilt, wrongness or injustice without already understanding the necessity 
that rules, rights and promises generate. (This problem is sometimes called « Hume’s 
Circle9 ».) Our x – the necessity that rules, rights and promises generate – thus is one of 
these philosophically puzzling cases. We must look for an answer that does not take the 
form of a « translation or analysis ». 
Step 3 : Anscombe suggests : « What we have to attend to is the use of modals10 ». 
Instead of offering a « translation or analysis » of necessity-generated-by-rules-rights-or-
promises, Anscombe offers a description of our practices and of our ability to use certain 
modal expressions – in particular a class that she calls « stopping modals ». She illustrates 
what these modals are as follows : 
« If I say “You can’t wear that !” and it’s not, e.g., that you are too fat to get it on, that’s 
what I call a stopping modal11. » 
Anscombe gives a description of how children learn to use these modal expressions 
and what role they play in our lives. In particular, Anscombe points out that stopping 
modals often occur with « what sounds like a reason », although it turns out that it is not 
a reason in the sense of an independently intelligible fact that could serve to ground the 
stopping modal. She calls such reasons « logoi12 ». 
« [What we mention] appears to be a reason. And it is a “reason” in the sense of a logos, 
a thought. But if we ask what the thought is, and for what it is a reason, we’ll find that 
we can’t explain them separately. We can’t explain the “You can’t” on its own ; in any 
                                                        
9 For a discussion of this see K. Nieswandt, « Di Rights Exist by Convention or by Nature ? », Topoi, online 
first, 2015. 
10 G. E. M. Anscombe, « Rules, Rights and Promises », The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe 
(vol. III), op. cit., 1981, p. 100. 
11 Ibid., p. 101. 
12 Ibid., pp. 101-102. 
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independent sense it is simply not true that he can’t (unless “they” physically stop 
him). But neither does “it’s N’s …” have its peculiar sense independent of the relation 
to “you can’t”13. » 
Using stopping modals together with certain logoi is the paradigmatic way to 
express the necessity generated by a rule, a right or a promise. 
« Now, this form : “you can’t …, its N’s …”, though it has other applications as well, is 
also the form par excellence in which a right is ascribed to N14 ». 
Anscombe goes on to suggest that « rule », « right » and « promise » indicate logos-
types ; « they tell us the formal character of the stopping modal15 ».  
Step 4 : Anscombe’s description of our practices helps us understand what a right (a 
rule or a promise) is, even though we still lack an independent explication. In the last 
paragraph of the paper, Anscombe summarizes her account thus : 
« These “musts” and “can’ts” are the most basic expression of such-and-such’s being 
a rule ; just as they are the most basic expression in learning the rules of a game, and 
as they are too in being taught rights and manners. But they aren’t, in Hume’s phrase, 
“naturally intelligible”. The mark of this is the relation of interdependence between 
the “you can’t” and the “reason” where this is what I have called the theme or logos of 
the “you can’t”. These musts and can’ts are understood by those of normal intelligence 
as they are trained in the practices of reason16. » 
This is a resolution of our philosophical puzzle because it (a) explains why we 
cannot give a straightforward answer to the question « What is the necessity generated 
by rules, rights, and promises ? » and (b) it allows us to see how our thought and talk about 
this necessity is grounded in an entirely non-mysterious practice. Stopping modals form 
part of larger social games, in which we are trained as we grow up. This is why rules, rights 
and promises on the one hand and the necessity they generate on the other depend on 
each other conceptually (but in a pragmatically grounded way). Anscombe has argued 
that the request to fill in the dots in : « The necessity that rules, rights, and promises give 
rise to is … » with something independently intelligible asks for something that cannot 
exist. Nevertheless, she has given us an informative alternative answer, namely that rules, 
rights, and promises can only exist within social practices, more precisely practices that 
involve the use of a particular kind of modal expression. This answer is not a « translation 
or analysis » because we cannot explain what a practice is without relying on the idea of 
                                                        
13 Ibid., p. 101. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., p. 102. 
16 Ibid., p. 103. 
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a rule. We haven’t broken out of Hume’s Circle ; rather, we have situated rules, rights and 
promises from within the circle by attending to the broader context in which they have 
their home. 
To summarize : We ask what that is, a rule, a right or a promise (step 1), and discover 
that any attempted definition or analysis ends up in a circle (step 2). An alternative, 
Anscombe suggests, is to look at how we think of and talk about rules, rights and promises. 
As it turns out, all three form part of larger social practices, in which we are trained as we 
grow up (step 3). How does this answer our original question ? It tells us why the type of 
answer we originally sought cannot exist, and it gives us insight into rules, rights and 
promises by relating them to a broader context of social practices. It furthermore contains 
a surprising thesis about the ontology of rules, rights and promises : they only exist as 
part of human practices (step 4). 
 
2.2. « The First Person » 
In « The First Person », Anscombe argues that « “I” is neither a name nor another 
kind of expression whose logical role is to make a reference17 ». This thesis, she thinks, is 
an important step on the way to an adequate understanding of self-consciousness. Let us 
try to discern our pattern again. 
Step 1 : Anscombe starts with the question : What does « I » mean ? She is clear that 
she does not mean this as a question about reference but as a question regarding the sense 
of the word « I ». She asks what grasping the concept expressed by « I » amounts to. 
Step 2 : Anscombe explores different straightforward answers, all of which are 
proposals for how to pick out the referent of « I » so as to employ the concept expressed 
by « I ». That is, they are accounts of the form : grasping the meaning of « I » is to be able 
to pick out object O in way W. None of these straightforward answers works. To see this, 
let’s first assume that the way W of picking out O must involve sensory stimulation. Now, 
« I » cannot be a name for oneself, nor a demonstrative, nor any other kind of indexical 
that is such that we need sensory stimulation to determine its referent. After all, sensory 
deprivation does not prevent us from using « I » in the usual way. In a situation of sensory 
deprivation, « I have not lost my “self-consciousness” ; nor can what I mean by “I” be an 
                                                        
17 G. E. M. Anscombe, « The First Person », The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe (vol. II), 
op. cit., p. 32. 
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object no longer present to me18 ». If way W does not involve sensory stimulation, then 
the referent of « I » must be given to me in some non-sensory way. It thus seems that « I » 
must mean something like « my Cartesian Ego » or « the thinker/speaker of this ». 
However, neither of these « translations or analyses » work. The first « translation » 
cannot explain why we cannot make mistakes in identifying our Cartesian Egos ; the 
second cannot guarantee that there is really only one thinker/speaker and not many. So 
all our attempts to say what « I » means by specifying how the user of « I » must pick out 
its referent fail. An understanding of « I » must consist in something other than the ability 
to pick out a certain referent. 
Step 3 : Anscombe suggests that to grasp the meaning of « I » is to possess a certain 
ability. It is to be able to express and use-in-thought the unmediated, reflective 
consciousness of states, actions, motions etc. of our body. Uses of « I » must be 
appropriately related to this « subjectless19 » consciousness of states, actions, motions etc. 
This constitutes the meaning of « I »20. 
« […] “I” is not a name : these I-thoughts are examples of reflective consciousness of 
states, actions, motions, etc., not of an object I mean by “I”, but of this body. These I-
thoughts (allow me to pause to think some !) … are unmediated conceptions 
(knowledge or belief, true of false) of states, motions, etc., of this object here, about 
which I can find out (if I don’t know it) that it is E.A21. » 
Step 4 : Anscombe concludes her paper by saying : « The (deeply rooted) 
grammatical illusion of a subject is what generates all the errors which we have been 
considering22 ». She thinks that what lies at the bottom of the puzzles about « I » is that 
we are looking for a conception of oneself, a way of picking out oneself, that one must have 
in order to use « I » correctly. If Anscombe is right, however, then there is no need for such 
a conception. Instead, the unmediated conceptions that allow us to have I-thoughts are 
« subjectless ». « I » is, as it were, marking a particular status of a conception as acquired 
by reflective consciousness, rather than picking out the subject of the conception. So, our 
ability to use « I » neither depends on sensory stimulation nor on our ability to identify a 
Cartesian Ego or a thinker. As in the case of rules, rights and promises, our problems are 
dissolved in that we realize we have been looking for the wrong kind of answer all along. 
                                                        
18 Ibid., p. 31. 
19 Ibid., p. 36. 
20 Anscombe spells out why she can still accept the principle that if X asserts something with « I » as subject, 
her assertion is true just in case it is true of X. 
21 G. E. M. Anscombe, « The First Person », art. cit., p. 34. 
22 Ibid., p. 36. 
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The question « What does “I” mean ? » receives a deflationary answer, in the sense that, 
on Anscombe’s view, there is no such thing as an « I » or a « self ». Although this reaction 
of Anscombe has a « deflationary » aspect, it is also a substantive metaphysical thesis. 
 
2.3. « The Intentionality of Sensation » 
In « The Intentionality of Sensation », Anscombe asks : What are the immediate 
objects of sensation ? She focuses on the sense modality of sight and argues that we must 
distinguish what she calls « material objects » of sight from « intentional objects » of sight. 
Intentional objects are not objects in the sense of entities. Rather, the idea of an 
intentional object should be understood on the model of a grammatical object. Let’s go 
through our pattern again23. 
Step 1 : Anscombe asks : What are the « proper » and « immediate » objects of sight ? 
Some people think that these are the ordinary physical objects around us ; others believe 
that we immediately only see sense-data or something the like. This disagreement reflects 
a puzzle that naturally arises. On the one hand, it seems commonsensical to think that you 
sometimes see things like tables, chairs or dogs. On the other hand, in cases of illusions 
and hallucinations, we can sometimes truly say of someone that she sees, e.g., a pink 
elephant although there is no such elephant anywhere near her. In such cases, we might 
be inclined to say that what the subject sees is a sense-image or something the like. If that 
is what one sees in cases of illusions and hallucinations, however, then it seems 
implausible to think that we don’t see such sense-images in cases of veridical perception, 
too – thus rejecting commonsense regarding tables, chairs and the like. And from that 
position it is not far to skepticism about the external world. 
Step 2 : A straightforward answer to the question « What are the objects of 
sensation ? » would take the form « The objects of sensation are … », where « … » is some 
description of a particular kind of object. Anscombe argues that no account of this type 
works. After having explained the general structure of her own solution (to which we’ll 
turn below), Anscombe opens the second part of her essay thus : 
« In the philosophy of sense-perception there are two opposing positions. One says 
that what we are immediately aware of in sensation is sense-impressions, called 
« ideas » by Berkeley and “sense-data” by Russell. The other, taken up nowadays by 
“ordinary language” philosophy, says that on the contrary we at any rate see objects 
(in the wide modern sense which would include e.g. shadows) without any such 
                                                        
23 The order of the steps of our pattern does not match the order of exposition in Anscombe’s essay. 
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intermediaries. […] I wish to say that both these positions are wrong […]24. » 
Hallucinations speak against the ordinary language view. In such cases, we can truly 
say that someone sees something, without there being any object (in the relevant sense) 
that is seen and without using the verb « to see » in a derivative or secondary sense. 
Against the sense-data view, Anscombe points out that there really is a sense in which one 
cannot see what isn’t there and that this sense is epistemologically prior and fundamental. 
« [W]e ought to say, not : “Being red is looking red in normal light to the normal-
sighted”, but rather “Looking red is looking as a thing that is red looks in normal light 
to the normal-sighted”25. » 
The sense-data theorist cannot easily accept this explanation of « looks red » – at 
least not for things other than sense-data. Furthermore, the idea that someone who 
hallucinates is really seeing a sense-image is analogous to the idea that someone who is 
worshipping a god that does not exist is really worshipping an idea – and the latter claim 
is clearly false. Thus, the sense-data theorist’s solution to the problem of non-existing 
objects of sensation does not carry over to cases to which it should, at least prima facie, 
carry over. 
One might try to find a third kind of straightforward answer by suggesting that the 
things seen in hallucinations are unreal or non-existing objects. But Anscombe thinks that 
this suggestion succumbs to the same objection that was raised against sense-data 
theories. Drawing an analogy between seeing and thinking, she says : 
« [T]he mere fact of real existence (is this now beginning to be opposed to existence 
of some other kind ?) can’t make so very much difference to the analysis of a sentence 
like “X thought of –”. So if the idea is to be brought in when the object doesn’t exist, 
then equally it should be brought in when the object does exist. Yet [in such cases] 
one is thinking, surely, of [e.g.] Winston Churchill [the man himself]26. » 
It seems that no account of the form « the objects of sensation are … » can be 
successful. After all, neither « ordinary objects », nor « sense-images » or the like, nor 
« unreal objects » can fill the place of the dots. And there seems to be no further plausible 
candidate. 
Anscombe thinks that it is a mistake to look for an answer of the form : « the objects 
of sensation are … » In the first part of her essay, she discusses this issue with view to the 
                                                        
24  G. E. M. Anscombe, « The Intentionality of Sensation », », The Collected Philosophical Papers of 
G. E. M. Anscombe (vol. II), op. cit., p. 11. 
25 Ibid., p. 14. 
26 Ibid., p. 5. 
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more encompassing class of what she calls « intentional objects », and she says : 
« The question [of what an intentional object is] is based on a mistake, namely that an 
explanatory answer running say “An intentional […] object is such-and-such” is 
possible and requisite. But this need not be so. Indeed the only reasonable candidates 
to be answers are the ones we have failed27. » 
How can the question what kind of entity the objects of sensation are be a mistake ? 
This will become clearer in the next step. 
Step 3 : Anscombe thinks it is helpful, in this situation, to compare our ability to think 
and talk about objects of sensation to our ability to think and talk about grammatical 
objects. (And here the « about » is again of Ryle’s linguistic variety.) For a similar, but less 
puzzling, situation arises there. We find out, e.g., what the direct object of the sentence 
« John sent Mary a book » is by asking : « What did John send Mary (according to the 
sentence) ? » And we answer : « A book ». However, there might not be any book that John 
sent Mary. And even if such a book exists, we cannot substitute salva veritate co-referring 
terms in our answer. This seems to suggest that our answer should really be « a book », 
i.e., that we should mention and not use the word « book ». However, the question « What 
did John send ? » cannot be answered correctly by saying, « The words “a book” ». Put 
differently, although there is a sense in which the grammatical object of a sentence is 
clearly a word or a phrase, you cannot understand what a grammatical object is unless 
you know how to answer questions like : « What did John send ? » And in the answer « a 
book » you are using the word « book » in a special way that is analogous to the way in 
which we use words that describe objects of sensation. The question « What kind of thing 
is this book that you are talking about ? » does not have any reasonable answer – nor does 
it need one. Anscombe thinks that this also holds for (a particular use of) questions like 
this : « What kind of thing is the pink elephant that you say you are seeing ? » Thus, a 
description of our ability to think and talk about grammatical objects gives us some 
insight into our ability to think and talk about objects of sensation. 
Step 4 : Our puzzle was that it seems that the objects of sensation are either ordinary 
objects or sense images (or the like) and that neither of these options is acceptable. 
Anscombe’s solution is this : We must distinguish between intentional objects and 
material objects of sensation. An expression that gives an intentional object of sensation 
is like « a book » in the answer to « What did John send ? » in the following way : (a) the 
                                                        
27 Ibid., p. 8. 
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thing it mentions might not exist, (b) where the thing exists we cannot always substitute 
a co-referential expression for our expression salva veritate, and (c) what is named can be 
indeterminate or vague (in a way that ordinary objects cannot be). With the analogy to 
grammatical objects in mind, we can say all that. And we can say it without being forced 
to say that we see sense-images (which would be the sense-data theorist’s way of 
explaining these three features)28. Turning to the other side of the distinction, the material 
object of a sensation is given by any expression that is co-referential with an expression 
that gives an (existing) intentional object of the sensation. 
We can use the verb « see » with an intentional or a material object. Those who think 
that the objects of sensation are ordinary objects treat « to see » as if it could only occur 
with a material object. That is the use of « see » in which we can say « You cannot see what 
isn’t there ». Anscombe acknowledges that there really is this use of « to see », but she 
thinks that there is also another use, namely the use with an intentional object. By 
distinguishing these, we can do justice to the correct motivations behind sense-data 
theory and those behind direct realism ; and we can do so without having to posit 
anything like sense-data. Thus, Anscombe’s account resolves our philosophical puzzle, 
without giving a translation or analysis of « object of sensation ». 
One upshot of Anscombe’s view is that perception must have content. We always 
perceive things « under a description », as it were. This comes out in the fact that 
descriptions of what one perceives are intentional in the sense of having features (a)-(c) 
above. So in spite of rejecting the question « What are the immediate objects of 
sensation ? », Anscombe puts forward a substantive thesis about perception. 
 
3. Anscombe’s Implicit Metaphilosophy 
All three papers we have looked at follow the structural pattern described in 
Section 1. In all three, Anscombe argues for a novel and interesting solution to the 
respective philosophical puzzle. One might take issue with many of her arguments and 
theses. Our aim in this last section, though, is not to defend them. Whatever the merits of 
Anscombe’s particular claims in the three discussed papers, we think that Anscombe’s 
argumentative pattern provides a useful approach to philosophical puzzles. And we want 
                                                        
28 A sense-data theorist’s explanation of the three features would go like this : (a) Images can show things 
that do not exist. (b) We cannot substitute parts of images that picture the same object for one another 
without changing the identity of the overall images. (c) There can be an image of, e.g., a tree that does not 
picture the tree as having a particular number of leaves. 
Klesis – 2016 : 35 – Lectures contemporaines de Elisabeth Anscombe 
 192 
to put this approach on the map of current alternatives in metaphilosophy. 
 
3.1. Her Deflationary Method Produces Substantive Metaphysical Claims 
Anscombe’s method typically leads to metaphysically deflationary accounts, very 
broadly construed. Either the puzzling « entity » turns out to be of a different 
metaphysical kind from what one has been looking for at the outset or the very question 
after its metaphysical status turns out to be a mistake. In « Rules, Rights and Promises », 
the necessity that arises from all three is found to be the necessity of a move within a 
certain practice. There is no « deeper » explanation of this necessity than simply putting 
the relevant practice in plain view. In « The First Person », we start by looking for a way 
of picking out a subject. This results in the need for an explanation of what egos, « selves », 
or « Is » are. Anscombe instead argues that « I » does not refer to any such entity ; it marks 
a certain perspective on objects and events. And in « The Intentionality of Sensation », 
Anscombe argues that our talk of the « object » of a perception lets us forget that 
perceptions are intentional ; they don’t have an « object » whose metaphysical status we 
could then further investigate (except a material object). (Is it a sense datum ? A real 
table ?) 
Notice, however, that the kinds of « deflation » Anscombe offers in the three papers 
differ in important respects. It does make sense, e.g., to ask after the metaphysical status 
of a right, at least in the sense in which this question is answered by saying : a right is 
something « whose existence does depend on human linguistic practice 29  ». This is a 
substantive metaphysical thesis about rights, since it amounts to a denial of the idea of 
natural rights. The answer is not a « translation or analysis » because we cannot 
understand what a practice is without relying on the idea of a rule and, hence, on an 
antecedent understanding of the necessity that is imposed, by rules, rights and promises. 
But the result is reached by showing that the relevant kind of necessity cannot be 
explained in a non-circular fashion 30 . The « deflation » consists in the ungrudging 
recognition that we cannot dig deeper than an account of our practices of using certain 
modal expressions. By contrast, Anscombe rejects the question after the metaphysical 
                                                        
29  G. E. M. Anscombe, « The Question of Linguistic Idealism », The Collected Philosophical Papers of 
G. E. M. Anscombe (vol. I), Oxford, Blackwell, 1981, p. 118. 
30 Here we leave out the important step form the claim that the necessity involved in rules, rights and 
promises cannot be explained without circularity to the claim that rules, rights, and promises exist by 
convention. 
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status of intentional « objects » of perception as a mistake. Here the « deflation » consists 
in the claim that the puzzle rests on our impulse to find an entity wherever there is an 
intentional object. Anscombe « deflates » the object of sensation to something that is not 
an entity. The « deflation » in « The First Person » is similar to this. After all, « I » does not 
have a referent. As in the case of rules, rights and promises, however, there is something 
informative that we can say in response to our initial question. We asked : What does « I » 
mean ? That is, what is it to grasp the meaning of sentences in which « I » occurs ? And we 
can say at least this much : « I-thoughts […] are unmediated conceptions […] of states, 
motions etc., of this object here », i.e. of my body31. 
Notice also what Anscombe does not do. (a) She does not presume that philosophy 
consists in analyzing concepts. In fact, she typically begins her philosophical 
investigations where the possibility of providing analyses gives out. (b) She does not pay 
disproportionate respect to the ordinary use of expressions and concepts 32 . When 
Anscombe argues that there is no straightforward solution to a problem, she is not 
restricting herself to solutions that are in accordance with the ordinary use of words. In 
« The Intentionality of Sensation », e.g., she also discusses the usual suspects in the 
philosophical tradition, which are often clearly revisionary. Where her arguments are 
successful, we could hence not evade the conclusion that there is no straightforward 
answer by changing our way of talking or thinking. She does not stubbornly refuse to 
consider the possibility that ordinary thought and talk need reform, as some philosophers 
in the Wittgensteinian tradition are sometimes accused of doing. (c) For the same reason, 
Anscombe’s appeals to our ordinary practices of using certain expressions and concepts 
as a solution to a puzzle is not aimed at critiquing alternative philosophical theories. She 
brings in our practices and abilities only after having rejected alternative views. (d) She 
is not claiming that all philosophical problems rest on confusions. Rather, she merely 
holds that some important philosophical problems don’t have straightforward solutions. 
And that is something very different. 
 
                                                        
31 G. E. M. Anscombe, « The First Person », art. cit., p. 34. 
32 As Anselm Müller (« G. E. M. Anscombe : Entdeckung einer philosophischen Entdeckerin », in Anscombe : 
Aufsätze, Berlin, Suhrkamp, 2014, p. 361) puts it, Anscombe « is not an advocate of “ordinary language 
philosophy”, which she thinks pays undue respect to colloquial speech and its nuances ». Roger Teichmann 
(The Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 228-229) makes a similar point. 
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3.2. Anscombe’s Metaphilosophy in Relation to Current Alternatives 
The conception of philosophy implicitly at work in the discussed papers can be 
summarized thus : (A) Many philosophical problems take the form of « What is x ? » or 
« What does “x” mean ? » (B) Solutions to such problems need not take the form of a 
« translation or analysis ». (C) When the method of analysis gives out, it is often helpful to 
look at the practices and abilities underlying our talk, thought and action regarding the 
puzzling phenomenon. Descriptions of these practices and abilities often provide us with 
an indirect solution to our problem. 
To be sure, these three points vastly underspecify Anscombe’s conception of 
philosophy. Nevertheless, it will be helpful to locate the resulting metaphilosophy relative 
to other metaphilosophies. To this end, we can adapt Kevin Sharp’s33 helpful classification 
of philosophical methods. Sharp distinguishes six philosophical methods. In the list below 
we have changed Sharp’s ordering and added a few names. (For each of the named 
philosophers, some might question whether they actually fall into the respective category, 
but our point here simply is to sketch a map.) 
1. « Methodological Naturalism » claims that philosophy is continuous with the 
sciences and should be pursued as the most abstract and theoretical part of the 
sciences. (W.v.O. Quine) 
2. « Experimental Philosophy » suggests we should investigate our intuitions and 
concepts empirically. (J. Knobe, E. Machery) 
3. « Conceptual analysis » tries to solve philosophical puzzles through finding 
illuminating a priori or analytic connections between concepts. (A.J. Ayer) 
4. « Reductive explanations » try to explain philosophically puzzling phenomena by 
means of some kind of reduction to less puzzling phenomena via translation, a 
priori entailment, or metaphysical constitution/grounding/identity relations (or a 
combination thereof). (J.J. Smart, F. Jackson on ethics) 
5. « Quietism » about phenomena « avoids proposing and defending philosophical 
theories, and instead sees philosophical problems as the result of confusions that 
are often caused by misunderstanding language » (Scharp 2013, Sect. 0.1.5). (J. 
McDowell is often named as a proponent, but he sometimes protests against this 
label.) 
                                                        
33 K. Sharp, Replacing Truth, Oxford University Press, 2013, Sect. 0.1.5. 
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6. « Analytic Pragmatism », which « [i]nstead of emphasizing the relations between 
sets of concepts on which conceptual analysis or reductive explanation focuses » 
looks « to relations between how words are used and the concepts those words 
express » (Scharp 2013, Sect. 0.1.5). (W. Sellars, R. Brandom) 
Anscombe’s view clearly differs from Methodological Naturalism and Experimental 
Philosophy in that, for her, philosophical problems are typically problems that cannot be 
fruitfully addressed by empirical means. The method of conceptual analysis, too, has 
limited applicability for her. After all, she holds that in some important cases, there are 
principled reasons to think that we cannot give a « translation or analysis » of the crucial 
concepts. For the same reason, Anscombe must think that there are cases where no 
reductive explanation is possible. For we cannot find the translations or a priori 
entailments or metaphysical relations that would be needed for such an explanation. Note 
that Anscombe’s descriptions of practices are not (attempted) reductive explanations. It 
is clear, e.g., that Anscombe does not think that we can give a reductive explanation of 
what a rule is – doing so would mean to escape Hume’s Circle.34 
Anscombe is also not a quietist. She believes that philosophy can yield interesting 
and surprising results. She clearly does not think, e.g., that her claims that the normative 
force of rules, rights and promises depends on human practices or that « I » is not a 
referring expression are unsurprising or not substantive. Furthermore, she is not 
reluctant to put forward philosophical theses and theories. 
Analytic Pragmatism seems closer to Anscombe’s way of doing philosophy than any 
of the other methods. Like Sellars and Brandom, Anscombe believes that a large part of 
the philosopher’s task is to describe the use of terms that are crucial for a given 
philosophical topic (such as the terms « promise » or « I »). For the analytic pragmatists, 
however, most philosophically interesting concepts, on reflection, turn out to be 
« covertly metalinguistic ». The role of these concepts is to « make explicit », describe, 
convey or express fundamental and universal features of our talk and thought. These 
concepts may, e.g., allow us to express ideas regarding the conceptual framework that we 
are using. Or they « convey » the same ideas as overtly metalinguistic claims 35 . For 
                                                        
34 Anscombe’s attitude towards « purely metaphysical reductions » that do not claim to give any explanation 
of, e.g., the concept of a right is complex. She has her own, very special, version of « nothing over and 
above »-theses. See her « On Brute Facts » (The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe (vol. III), 
op. cit., 1981). 
35 (see R. Brandom, From Empiricism to Expressivism : Brandom Reads Sellars, Harvard University Press, 
2014, Ch. 1 and 7, for a helpful discussion of this) 
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Anscombe, on the other hand, the mere fact that there is no « translation or analysis » of 
a concept and that we must understand it through describing the practices in which it is 
used, does not imply that this concept has the role of expressing, conveying or making 
explicit something about these practices (although some of the concepts in which 
Anscombe is interested might be of this metalinguistic type). 
The pattern we have described does hence not fit nicely into any of the six categories 
that Sharp helpfully distinguishes. We think that Anscombe’s view deserves careful 
consideration and its own place on the map of current metaphilosophy. 
 
3.3. Anscombe Values T-Philosophy 
In Anscombe’s writings, we can see a version of the conceptual turn (broadly 
construed) at work that does not treat philosophical problems as pseudo-problems, as 
resting on confusions that are particular to the philosopher or as problems that are in an 
important sense merely about thought and talk and not about the world36. In the papers 
we discussed, e.g., Anscombe argues that rules, rights and promises depend for their 
existence on social practices, that there are no such things as Cartesian Egos or the like, 
and that perception has content. These are not just claims about the way we think or talk, 
nor are these claims responses to pseudo-problems or something that is obvious to 
everyone who is not in the grip of some confusion induced by philosophy. Thus, Anscombe 
must think that putting forward substantive and surprising philosophical theses about 
the world can be rational. (Naturally, reflecting on our conceptual abilities and practices 
can be a crucial step on the way to such a thesis.) This sets Anscombe’s view apart from 
metaphilosophies like the one Paul Horwich37 attributes to Wittgenstein. 
Of course, Anscombe’s way of doing philosophy is heavily influenced by 
Wittgenstein. In « The Reality of the Past », e.g., she says : « Everywhere in this paper I 
have imitated his [i.e. Wittgenstein’s] ideas and methods of discussion38 ». And Anscombe, 
just like Wittgenstein, « is infuriatingly prone to take each case on its merits39 », rather 
than to apply a general theory. 
However, she is equally influenced by the views of Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume and 
                                                        
36 For a defense of conceptual analysis against Williamson’s (The Philosophy of Philosophy, Blackwell, 2007) 
criticism that makes some related points see M. Balcerak Jackson & B. Balcerak Jackson’s « Understanding 
and Philosophical Methodology » (Philosophical Studies 161/2, 2012, pp. 185-205). 
37 P. Horwich, Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy, Oxford University Press, 2012. 
38 G. E. M. Anscombe, « The Reality of the Past », art. cit., p. 114n. 
39 R. Teichmann, The Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe, op. cit., p. 1. 
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Frege – at least some of which Horwich would presumably classify as « T-philosophy ». 
Anscombe does not share Horwich’s conviction that « T-philosophy is indeed 
irrational40 ». Rather, her philosophy is an attempt to synthesize analytic philosophy with 
the ancient and medieval tradition. 
 
Conclusion 
We hope to have accomplished two things : first, we hope that our description of the 
pattern we identified in Anscombe’s work helps in understanding that work. Seeing the 
pattern can help to identify the crucial claims of a given paper as well as Anscombe’s 
general stance on what philosophical problems are and how to tackle them. Second, we 
hope to have shown that Anscombe’s method – or at least the part we have described here 
– does not fit easily into any preconceived metaphilosophy. Perhaps we have even 
convinced the reader that Anscombe’s implicit conception of philosophy is worth 
exploring and deserves a place in current debates in metaphilosophy. 
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